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WHAT GOOD ARE THE ARTS? By John Carey, Faber and Faber, London:
2005, pp. xii + 286
John Carey’s book is a marvelous read. It is beautifully written, the argument is
lucid, it assembles some fascinating evidence and calls for debate on one of the few
social topics on which practitioners and philosophical thinkers tend to speak the
same language. I learned much from the book; I also disagreed with quite a bit of it.
But Carey has provided such a useful service that criticism must be continuing the
argument, not trying to undermine it.
Carey means to debunk several myths, including the idea that there is some
essence or set of criteria that identifies what is art. He argues that attempts to
identify a sub-set of ‘genuine’ artworks are premised on the assertion that one
person’s feelings are more valuable than another’s. Carey dismisses this, arguing
we cannot know another person’s feelings and that in any case, ranking feelings in
terms of their value is arbitrary: ultimately, just a matter of how you feel. Art, Carey
thinks, is just what the individual thinks to be art (question: do people—including
ordinary members of the public looking at an exhibition—think that judging artworks
is judging people’s feelings? Carey does not consider ontology of art; in fact,
the opening of the book implies that realism here—and in ethics—would have to be a
‘religious’ matter).
If Carey is right, we cannot rank art at all as art, which I find hard to square with
our ideas and practices of artistic growth and development. For example, I know a
composer who moved from writing pleasant, derivative tunes to developing an
independent and quite revolutionary voice. I can describe this change best in terms
that are neither purely factual nor simple reflection of my own feelings: I can best
discuss his growth and improvement as a creative artist within the terms of the art of
music. Carey would presumably try to reduce the musicology here, like the artworks
themselves, to fact or to taste. He is a nominalist about art: there are no universals,
only individual artworks made so by individuals’ reactions and decisions. He does
not offer a theoretical argument: true nominalist, he simply says without criticism
‘this is what has happened: people now call ‘‘art’’ whatever they feel like.’
He does not take a position on whether someone can describe something as art
without first having a concept or idea of art. He might say that the concept of art too
is personal—which may be true in the sense that it is personal to me, my concept, but
hardly in the sense that its content is entirely personal to me. We hold the concepts
we do because of our beliefs about the truth, not because we feel like holding these
concepts. Anyone who says they ‘just feel like’ holding a certain concept of art, or of
anything else, isn’t accurately and fully describing what they do when they think
conceptually.
Carey is strongly empiricist (p. 174: ‘we cannot talk of truth and falsehood except
where proof is available . . .’). He calls often—and often rightly—for evidence, tests,
surveys before we can make claims about what ‘people’ think about art. But
individuals are rarely the (sole) authorities for their own responses. We can’t settle
complex issues just by piling up testimonial evidence. What matters too is the
thinking and reasons behind people’s testimonies—the meaning of this evidence—
and this calls for careful, including non-empirical, analysis. Carey may well have
demonstrated that we lack today a theory of art that is popularly acceptable, yet
people (me, for one) may still react as if we do have this theory, or at least could
have. Perhaps a good theory of art is still to be sought; perhaps it exists elsewhere

than in the enlightenment and post-enlightenment aestheticians Carey reviews.
Ch. 2 explores recent views that fashion, gardening and other familiar activities are
art; or rather, that the category of art should be dropped in favour of a broader class
of activities we find special, enthralling, encouraging. Since all such activities must
serve our evolutionary needs, football or fashion may be more valuable than
Poussins or symphonies. But humans have other than evolutionary needs—reason
means we can transform or extend our evolutionary inheritance from mere survival
into an interest in the potentially infinite questions of knowledge, action and appreciation.
Art that satisfies these more cerebral needs can also benefit the activities that
connect us more directly with survival: thus gardening and fashion may benefit from
the content of traditional arts as well as explain the roots of these arts. Perhaps it is
the interplay between developed art and natural practices that makes gardening
more than subsistence, fashion more than attracting a mate, football more than
hunting raids. If so, the high-versus-popular-art debate does not reflect the reality,
whether one takes Carey’s position within that debate or not.
A major feature of Carey’s book is advocacy for participatory, hands-on art
defined against power-house, showcase art. But these can co-exist, as they surely
must: without the Jessye Normans and Yehudi Menuhins the profile of art, standards
of art teaching, crafting of instruments to the highest level, ability and capacity
of people to articulate the importance of art within prisons and other deprived
communities, would all suffer. What happens if a prisoner encouraged to express
through art his need for social inclusion turns out to be the next Placido Domingo?
We then have ‘power-house’, quality art, and he now needs and deserves training,
work, colleagues, professional advice, opportunities, variety of repertoire all of the
highest caliber. It is naı¨ ve to think there would be people to inspire prisoners to put
on Macbeth—or would be Macbeth in 2005—were there not drama schools, a culture
of theatre, recognition and remuneration for writers and actors, a range of opportunities
at different levels.
Carey questions the idea that art makes us better people. His discussion here is
original and his case that participatory art helps and improves people is strong. But I
think the link between quality art and goodness deserves more attention. Good
philosophical work on creativity, imagination and choice is available, as well as
the cant Carey rightly dismisses. Also, the art/religion connection, which Carey only
touches on, deserves investigation. Anyone with a knowledge or history of religious
experience, anyone even moved often to prayer, takes part in an experience that is
creative, appreciative and serious, and that means it includes aesthetic experience. It
is absurd to think subscribing to the local rep makes you a better person. But it can
help tutor emotion in busy people and sensitise us to deeper thinking on the world
and our contemporary inadequacies; the psychological and social analysis of why it
does not inevitably do so is but one half of the matter.
Part II argues that alone of the arts literature can coherently and intelligently
criticise itself. This is complicated: only literature can make criticism (that is itself
literature) of literature, but surely only music can make criticism (that is itself music)
of music. There are examples a-plenty of (intentionally) anti-music music, antipainting
painting etc. Carey thinks (p. 177) that literature is the only art that can
criticise anything, at all. This is because of its relation to reasoning. It’s true that only
persons can argue, and argument is using words, but what is special about literature
is that it makes art out of argument’s tools—words—not that it is closer to reason.
Literature seems no closer (whatever that means) to reason than dance which uses

the human medium of argument—the body—to make art, or music which uses its
very freedom from argument to express structure and order more directly. Carey also
argues only literature can moralise, which I find simply wrong: what about the Pieta?
Shostakovich’s symphonies? Mime?
Carey believes all literature has an indistinctness which empowers the reader to
exercise imagination. He reminds us we may well disagree with him here, but that
this is expected since his thesis is the importance of subjective judgement and
personal response. This is unconvincing (if you accept my view, you prove my thesis;
if you reject it, you prove my thesis). In fact, since Carey’s thesis on literature
depends on his own interpretation of literary examples, if we do not agree with
these interpretations, we have been given little reason to accept the thesis. His claims
for literature over the other arts can be hard to credit: musicians and others would
probably be puzzled about the allegedly unique ways in which we can make literature
our own and use it imaginatively. I also find heavy-handed the argument that art
makes no truth-claims which is why very different conflicting artworks can co-exist
while conflicting scientific theories cannot. Perhaps instead art’s special relation to
truth is expressive: an infinity of different expressions of truth can evidently co-exist
though an infinity of different (scientific) propositions about truth cannot.
This book deeply interested me, particularly in its assembly of recent studies from
different fields. It also left me wishing that distinctions between performance art and
other art, writing and literature, words and music and so on had been teased out in
Part II which makes some very bold claims. My strongest response by far is conviction
that Carey is right about participatory art, but disappointment that with some
cheap shots at Covent Garden he has dismissed what quality art means and what it
might do for real people and communities.
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